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International disputes over subsidies are increasingly disrupting the world trading system. The
creation of the WTO was nearly prevented by disputes in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations
over the issue of negotiating disciplines on agricultural subsidies, an issue which continues to plague
the ongoing Doha Round of WTO negotiations. Ongoing disputes over subsidies that violate existing
WTO rules have led to the largest amount of authorized retaliation in GATT/WTO history. Yet the
international rules that govern subsidies have received little attention in the form of systematic
economic analysis. In this paper we provide a first formal analysis of the international rules that
govern the use of subsidies to domestic production (as distinct from export subsidies). Our analysis
highlights the impact of the new disciplines on subsidies that were added to GATT rules with the
creation of the WTO. Our results suggest that, although GATT subsidy rules were typically viewed
as weak and inadequate while the WTO subsidy rules are seen as representing a significant
strengthening of multilateral disciplines on subsidies, the key changes introduced by the WTO
subsidy rules may ultimately do more harm than good to the multilateral trading system, by
undermining the ability of tariff negotiations to serve as the mechanism for expanding market access
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International disputes over domestic subsidies are increasingly disrupting the world trading
system.  The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a successor to GATT was nearly
prevented by disputes in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations over the issue of negotiating
disciplines on agricultural subsidies, an issue which continues to plague the ongoing Doha Round
of WTO negotiations.  And ongoing disputes over subsidies that violate existing WTO rules have
led to the largest amount of authorized retaliation in GATT/WTO history.  Yet despite their evident
importance, the international rules that govern subsidies have received little attention in the form of
systematic economic analysis.  
Perhaps surprisingly, when viewed in the light shed by the existing theoretical literature on
domestic subsidies in trading economies, the notion of international agreements that seek to limit
the use of subsidies looks at one level immediately suspect.  After all, a central message of the theory
of distortions and welfare is the targeting principle (see Bhagwati and Ramaswami, 1963, and
Johnson, 1965), under which the optimal intervention targets the affected margin directly.
According to this principle, production subsidies are almost always a preferred policy instrument to
tariffs.  This is because a production subsidy distorts only one margin (i.e., producer decisions), and
can therefore constitute a “first-best” instrument of intervention in the presence of production
distortions, whereas it is well-understood that a tariff distorts two margins (i.e., producer and
consumer decisions) and therefore almost never corresponds to first-best intervention.  In this light,
attempts to discipline the use of production subsidies appear misguided, if they simply redirect
government interventions toward the use of “second-best” instruments of intervention such as tariffs.
Of course, tariffs themselves have long been the subject of international agreements, with
tariff commitments comprising the traditional focus of GATT negotiations.  And the concern that,
if left unrestrained, the use of subsidies could thwart the impacts of negotiated tariff liberalization
has been a long-standing motivation for the continuing attempts by GATT/WTO member
governments to introduce “discipline” into the use of subsidies. But the subsidy disciplines that are
increasingly leading to disputes are in many ways more constraining of governments than the tariff1We provide an alternative interpretation in Bagwell and Staiger (1997), but this alternative arises only under
very special circumstances.
2The WTO rules governing production subsidies are at the heart of the disagreements over agriculture that
continue to plague the Doha Round, and individual subsidy disputes in the WTO frequently center on production (as
opposed to export) subsidies as well. 
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commitments they negotiate within the GATT/WTO.  At a basic level, this feature raises the concern
that the search for effective subsidy disciplines may have gotten off track, since it is a feature that
runs counter to what simple reliance on the targeting principle would suggest is warranted.  In any
event, to sort out these various concerns, what is needed is an analysis of the impacts of subsidy
disciplines of various designs in a setting where governments may also negotiate over tariffs.  
Elsewhere (Bagwell and Staiger, 2001a), we have examined the logic of GATT/WTO rules
regarding the use of export subsidies.  While GATT/WTO rules prohibit the use of export subsidies,
we demonstrated there that it is difficult to interpret these rules as representing anything other than
an inefficient victory of exporter interests over importer and world interests.
1  At a casual level, it
might be thought that our export subsidy results should carry over to the case of production
subsidies, and therefore that an independent analysis of the international rules governing production
subsidies is not warranted.  Export subsidies, however, are distinct from production subsidies, and
it is well-known that the economic effects of the two forms of intervention are fundamentally
different (export subsidies, like tariffs, distort both producer and consumer decisions).  Hence, there
is good reason to expect (as we confirm below) that our analysis of export subsidies bears little
formal relation to an analysis of the international rules regarding subsidies to domestic production.
In the present paper, then, we provide a first formal analysis of the international rules that
govern the use of subsidies to domestic production.  Our analysis highlights the impact of the new
disciplines on subsidies that were added to GATT rules with the creation of the WTO.
2  We work
within a standard 2-country 2-good competitive general equilibrium trade model, augmented to
include government choices of domestic production subsidies and also possibly domestic
consumption taxes, in addition to tariffs. Our modeling of government objectives extends Bagwell
and Staiger (1999) to allow for domestic production subsidies/consumption taxes, and is consistent3For example, as Jackson (1989, p. 259) points out, the 1979 GATT Subsidies Code observes that domestic
subsidies “...are widely used for the promotion of social and economic policy objectives,” and states that it is not the
intent of the Code “...to restrict the right of signatories to use such subsidies to achieve these and other important policy
objectives which they consider desirable.”  
4Hence, at a broad level the fundamental “problem” faced by the GATT/WTO with regard to domestic subsidies
is analogous to that identified in Bagwell and Staiger (2001b) for the case of domestic standards.  
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with many possible underlying motives for the imposition of a production subsidy, including the
pursuit of distributive goals in the presence of political economy motivations and the pursuit of
allocative efficiency goals in the presence of local (i.e., not trans-border) non-pecuniary externalities.
This is an important feature of the model, as the long history of GATT/WTO attempts to discipline
domestic subsidies has taken place against the backdrop of explicit acknowledgment by member
governments of the legitimate role of domestic subsidies in government policy programs.
3
Within this economic environment, we first characterize the policy choices that attain points
on the international efficiency frontier (defined with the objectives of each government), and follow
Bagwell and Staiger (2001b) in interpreting the conditions that define these efficient points in terms
of market access.  Under this interpretation, international efficiency requires the attainment of
appropriate levels of market access from each country (the “international” efficiency condition), and
requires as well that each country deliver its market access level with an appropriate mix of policies
(the “national” efficiency condition).  We then characterize the non-cooperative Nash policy choices.
Comparing the Nash policy choices to efficient policy choices, we show that the Nash policies are
inefficient for a single reason: they deliver inefficiently low levels of domestic and foreign market
access.  This characterization of the Nash inefficiency allows in turn a succinct description of the
“problem” that the GATT/WTO can solve, namely, how to enable its member-governments to reach
efficient (higher) levels of market access, and thereby meet the international efficiency condition,
without disrupting their national efficiency conditions.
4
We next consider the possibility that governments might implement internationally efficient
policy choices with negotiations over tariffs alone, when they face either of two distinct sets of
“disciplines” on their unilateral choices of domestic subsidy/tax levels, one set corresponding to4
GATT subsidy rules and the other corresponding to WTO subsidy rules.  In this way, we seek first
to identify “weaknesses” in GATT subsidy disciplines that might prevent governments from reaching
the international efficiency frontier under GATT tariff negotiations, and then to gauge the degree to
which WTO subsidy rules might be seen as marking an improvement.
To represent the key features of GATT subsidy rules, we highlight the two central
mechanisms by which a government could respond to the subsidies of a trading partner prior to the
creation of the WTO:  “countervailing duty” (CVD) measures, and “non-violation nullification-or-
impairment” (NVNI) complaints.  More specifically, if the subsidy was offered to exporting
producers, then a government whose import-competing producers experienced material injury on
account of the subsidy (and whose import tariff on that product was legally bound in a GATT
agreement) could unilaterally impose a CVD against the subsidized imports.  If the subsidy was
instead offered to import-competing producers, then a government that had previously negotiated
a tariff binding on that product with the subsidizing government would have a legitimate basis for
making an NVNI claim concerning its market access rights, under which the subsidizing government
would then be expected to make a policy adjustment that returned market access to its original level
(though the government would be under no obligation to remove the subsidy).
A central question is whether governments have available a sufficiently rich set of domestic
instruments that they enjoy a degree of policy redundancy which can be exploited under tariff
negotiations.  In particular, as is well known, the effects of a tariff can be duplicated by a
combination production subsidy/consumption tax, and so a government that has access to tariffs as
well as a full set of production subsidies and consumption taxes enjoys a degree of policy
redundancy.  Assuming that this rich set of domestic instruments is available, we show that GATT
subsidy rules are sufficient to ensure that an internationally efficient policy combination will be
implemented under GATT tariff negotiations.  Moreover, we find that efficiency under GATT tariff
negotiations is attained even when responding to subsidies under GATT rules is allowed to be quite
costly.  Intuitively, governments can position tariffs in their negotiations so as to imply a level of
market access which yields an NVNI “trigger point” – a point beyond which further erosion of one5
country’s market access level would warrant initiation of a costly NVNI claim by its trading partner
in order to reinstate the negotiated market access level – set equal to the efficient level of market
access.  Subsequent to these negotiations, the level of market access is then allowed to “slip” back
to this trigger point through the unilateral choice of domestic subsidy and tax policies – and the
redundancy of policy instruments ensures that the national efficiency condition is not disrupted in
the process – but the threat of NVNI beyond this point keeps market access levels from falling below
their efficient levels.  
We turn next to the WTO subsidy rules, the main features of which are reflected in the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM).  When applied within the context of
our model, we argue that the key innovation of the SCM Agreement relative to GATT subsidy rules
is that, in addition to its rights under the GATT subsidy rules, any government now has the added
right to challenge – and, in principle, force the removal of – any positive subsidy.  Maintaining our
assumption that governments have sufficient instruments to enjoy a degree of policy redundancy, an
implication of our finding regarding the efficiency of GATT subsidy rules is of course that the
subsidy rules of the WTO cannot possibly mark an improvement in this setting.  Still, it might be
conjectured that the WTO subsidy rules, in providing governments with the ability to challenge and
remove a domestic instrument (subsidy) which is in any event redundant, will at least do no harm.
We show, however, that this conjecture is incorrect: a range of efficient outcomes that were
attainable under GATT subsidy rules are unattainable under the subsidy rules of the WTO.
Intuitively, the redundancy of policy instruments is utilized to achieve efficient outcomes through
tariff negotiations under the institutional constraints of the GATT subsidy rules, and by introducing
the potential that this redundancy will be removed, the WTO subsidy rules interfere with the ability
of governments to structure their tariff negotiations so as to achieve efficient policy combinations.
Finally, we consider a world in which the only domestic instrument is a production subsidy,
and so the policy redundancy featured above does not arise.  Because it simply eliminates
redundancy, this instrument restriction, of course, does not alter the welfare combinations that
correspond to the efficiency frontier, nor does it alter the Nash welfare levels.  But as we6
demonstrate, the elimination of policy redundancy has a number of important implications for the
efficiency properties of negotiated tariff outcomes under GATT and WTO subsidy rules.  
First, as can be anticipated from our description just above, in this  limited-instrument world,
the lack of policy redundancy interferes with the ability of governments to attain the efficiency
frontier under GATT subsidy rules.  In fact, if NVNI claims are costly, the lack of policy redundancy
in this limited-instrument world prevents governments from attaining any point on the efficiency
frontier under GATT subsidy rules, so that tariff negotiations under GATT subsidy rules are sure to
lead to policy outcomes that are internationally inefficient.  
Second, the fact that the outcome of tariff negotiations under GATT subsidy rules is sure to
be internationally inefficient in this environment raises at least the possibility that WTO subsidy
rules could then mark an improvement, and we show that this is indeed the case provided that the
use of subsidies is of sufficiently minor importance on the efficiency frontier. In effect, if domestic
subsidies have no legitimate reason to exist in an internationally efficient policy environment, then,
by allowing these subsidies to be challenged and removed, the “more effective” discipline introduced
under the WTO SCM Agreement is sure to be efficiency enhancing relative to the weaker subsidy
disciplines embodied in GATT rules in a limited-instrument costly-NVNI environment.  We observe,
however, that these circumstances are strikingly at odds with the views expressed by GATT/WTO
member governments concerning the legitimate role of subsidies in the pursuit of important public
policy objectives (see note 3).     
And third, we show that if the legitimate role for domestic subsidies is sufficiently
pronounced, WTO subsidy rules can be seen to mark a “step backward” relative to GATT subsidy
rules in a limited-instrument costly-NVNI world.  In particular, we demonstrate that, at least in the
case where the domestic government seeks to intervene on behalf of its import-competing producers,
if the role for subsidies is sufficiently pronounced, then the WTO subsidy rules will completely
undermine the ability of tariff negotiations to serve as the mechanism for expanding market access
to more efficient levels, and governments will be resigned to their Nash payoffs.  Intuitively, if7
governments consider the use of domestic subsidies to be sufficiently vital in their pursuit of policy
goals, they may be less inclined to negotiate tariff commitments under the subsidy rules of the WTO,
since such commitments may increase the likelihood that their subsidies will be challenged under
the SCM Agreement.  In this way, the SCM Agreement may have a “chilling” effect on the desire
of governments to take on further market access commitments through WTO negotiations.    
When taken together, our results signal a note of caution about the direction in which the
WTO is moving on the issue of domestic subsidies.  GATT subsidy rules were typically viewed as
weak and inadequate, while the WTO subsidy rules are seen as representing a significant
strengthening of multilateral disciplines on subsidies.  However, our results indicate that the key
changes introduced by the WTO subsidy rules may ultimately do more harm than good to the
multilateral trading system, by undermining the ability of tariff negotiations to serve as the
mechanism for expanding market access to more efficient levels.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II develops the model, and characterizes
the efficient and Nash policies, and describes the GATT/WTO bargaining frontier.  Section III
evaluates the efficiency properties of the GATT subsidy rules, while section IV considers the WTO
subsidy rules.  Section V turns to a world of limited instruments, and re-evaluates the performance
of GATT and WTO subsidy rules in this environment.  Section VI offers a brief conclusion. 
II.  The Model
Our starting point is the 2-country 2-good competitive general equilibrium trade model
adapted to allow for the possibility of both tariff and production subsidy/consumption tax choices.
To establish our main points simply, we introduce non-trade policies into the home country only, so
that the home government may choose both a tariff level and a level for its production subsidy and
its consumption tax, while the foreign government has only a tariff choice to make.  
II.1:  The Basic Trade Model
We assume that the home country exports good y to the foreign country in exchange for8
imports of good x.  The home government can impose a tariff on imports of good x, and it can also
choose to offer a domestic subsidy/tax to local producers of good x and possibly as well to
tax/subsidize the local consumption of good x.    In the home country, then, we must distinguish
between local consumer prices (inclusive of the consumption tax/subsidy) and local producer prices
(inclusive of the production tax/subsidy).  As only the price of x relative to the price of y matters in
our general equilibrium setting, it is immaterial whether these policy interventions take place in the
import-competing sector or the export sector, and we concentrate all interventions in the import-
competing sector.  We assume that the foreign government has simply an import tariff at its disposal,
and so a common set of prices is faced by both producers and consumers in the foreign country. 
Beginning with the home country, let   denote one plus the ad valorem production subsidy
offered to producers of good x in the home country (so that    ( ) reflects a production subsidy
(tax)), and similarly let   denote one plus the ad valorem consumption tax imposed on consumption
of good x in the home country (so that    ( ) reflects a consumption tax (subsidy)). We denote
the domestic producer price of good x (inclusive of the producer tax/subsidy) by   and the domestic
consumer price of good x (inclusive of the consumer tax/subsidy) by  .  The domestic (producer
and consumer) price of good y is denoted by  , with the ratio of domestic producer and consumer
prices then given by   and  , respectively.  The relationship between the domestic
relative price faced by domestic producers and that faced by domestic consumers is given by
.  Finally, let   denote one plus the ad valorem tariff imposed on imports of good x into the
home country (so that    ( ) reflects an import tax (subsidy)).  All net (positive or negative)
revenues generated by these instruments are distributed lump sum across domestic consumers.
Turning to the foreign country, our assumption that the foreign government has only a tariff
at its disposal simplifies the description of the foreign economy.  Let   denote one plus the ad
valorem tariff imposed on imports of good y into the foreign country (so that    ( ) reflects
an import tax (subsidy)), where here and throughout “*” is used to denote foreign variables.  We5In the domestic country, for example, international arbitrage implies that the before-tax price of good x faced
by domestic consumers,  , is equal to  , the before-tax price of an imported unit of good x.  This implies that
, or   as stated in the text.  Domestic producers of good x must meet the competition for domestic
consumers from foreign suppliers, and so the before-subsidy price collected by domestic producers of good x, ,  must
by international arbitrage be equal to  , which implies   or  , as stated in the text. 
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denote the local (consumer and producer) price of good x relative to good y in the foreign country
by  .  All net (positive or negative) tax revenues from the use of the foreign tariff are distributed
lump sum across foreign  consumers.
Finally, the relative “world price” (i.e., the relative exporter price   or terms of trade)
is denoted by  .  Under the maintained assumption that tariffs are non-prohibitive, international
arbitrage links each country’s local prices to the world price in light of its tariff according to
,   and  .
5
The foreign import demand and export supply functions may be written as functions of the
local relative price in the foreign country and the world price, and we denote these functions by
 and  , respectively. In an analogous fashion, the home-country import
demand and export supply functions may be written as functions of the local relative producer price 
and consumer price   in the home country and the world price  .  We denote these functions as
 and  , respectively.  With the relevant functions defined, the home and foreign
budget constraints may then be written as 
(1) ,
(2) .
The equilibrium world price,  , is determined by the requirement of market clearing for
good x, 10
(3) ,
where we have made explicit the dependence of the local producer prices  (consumer prices)  on the
producer subsidy (consumption tax) and tariffs and the world prices.  Market clearing for good y is
then implied by (1), (2) and (3).  
Using the market-clearing condition (3), it may be confirmed that 
(4) .
In words, a given percentage increase in the tariff has the same impact on the market-clearing world
price as does a combined increase in both the production subsidy and consumption tax by that same
percentage.  This, of course, reflects the basic equivalence between a tariff and a combination
production subsidy/consumption tax.    
We assume that the Marshall-Lerner stability conditions are met, so that an inward shift of
the domestic (foreign) import demand curve results in a lower (higher) equilibrium world price.  We
also assume that Metzler/Lerner-type Paradoxes are ruled out, so that  ,
,   and . 
Finally, we represent the objectives of the home and foreign governments with the general
functions   and  , respectively.  We assume that, holding its local prices fixed,
each government would prefer an improvement in its terms of trade: 
(5)  and   .
According to (5), governments like transfers of revenue from their trading partners.  We place no
other restrictions on the objectives of each government, although implicitly our representation of
government objectives rules out non-pecuniary trans-border externalities that could interact with the6We also assume throughout that these objective functions are everywhere differentiable and globally concave
in the policy variables.  
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choice of tariffs or production subsidies/consumption taxes.
6   
As we do not place restrictions on how a government feels about changes in its local prices,
our representation of government preferences is very general, and is consistent with formal models
of government policy determination in a wide variety of settings (see Bagwell and Staiger, 1999, for
a discussion of this in the context of tariff determination).  Of particular relevance for the present
discussion is the fact that our model is consistent with many possible underlying motives for the
imposition of a production subsidy in the home country, including the pursuit of distributive goals
in the presence of political economy motivations and the pursuit of allocative efficiency goals in the
presence of local (i.e., not trans-border) non-pecuniary externalities.  As we observed in the
Introduction (see especially note 3), this is an important feature of the model, as the long history of
GATT/WTO attempts to discipline domestic subsidies has taken place against the backdrop of
explicit acknowledgment by member governments of the legitimate role of domestic subsidies in
government policy programs. 
II.2: Efficient Policies 
We now define the international efficiency frontier.  To this end, let   denote any feasible
level of foreign welfare, i.e, any level of   for which there exists some   such that
.  We define the international efficiency frontier by the
combinations of   which, for each  , solve:
s.t. .
Notice that the international efficiency frontier is defined with respect to the governments’ own
objective functions which, as we have observed above, may include political economy7This is not to say that international subsidy agreements could not be evaluated on the basis of some alternative
criterion.  For example, a natural possibility would be to consider the potential role of subsidy agreements in allowing
each government to make policy commitments with regard to its own private sector.  In that case, international subsidy
agreements might be valuable to governments as a way of altering their interactions with their own citizens, rather than
as a way of altering their interactions with other governments as is the case in our analysis here.   For a broader
discussion of these two approaches to understanding the role of international trade agreements more generally, see
Bagwell and Staiger (2002).
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considerations.  In what follows we evaluate various approaches to the treatment of subsidies in
international trade agreements on the basis of whether these approaches allow governments to
achieve a position on the international efficiency frontier so defined.  As we discuss more broadly
in Bagwell and Staiger (2002), this seems appropriate in the context of the GATT/WTO, as the
GATT/WTO is an organization that facilitates the negotiation of trading arrangements that are
mutually beneficial to its members (i.e., the member governments).
7 
After some manipulation, and utilizing (4), the first-order conditions that define the
international efficiency frontier can be written as:  
(6) , 
(7) , and 
, where 
; ;  ;  and  .
To interpret these efficiency conditions, we follow Bagwell and Staiger (2001b) and define
the market access that a country provides to its trading partner by the volume of imports it would
accept at a particular world price.  This definition conforms to the notion of market access in the
GATT/WTO, and it is therefore useful in building a bridge between negotiated outcomes in the8For example, Petersmann (1997, p. 168) quotes a GATT Panel report describing the nature of the market access
commitments negotiated by member governments (“contracting parties”): “[T]he main value of a tariff concession is that
it provides an assurance of better market access through improved price competition. Contracting parties...base their tariff
negotiations on the expectation that the price effect of the tariff concessions will not be systematically offset.”  GATT
Panels have made a clear distinction between market access and export volume (Petersmann, 1997, p. 141), noting that
market access refers to the “conditions of competition” between imported and domestic products.  This is reflected in
our formal definition of market access above by evaluating import volume at a particular world (i.e., exporter) price.
We may think of the conditions of competition between imported and domestic products as remaining stable as long as
a particular exporter price would continue to bring forth the same volume of import demand. 
9To see this, note that changes in   and   which preserve the level of market access, evaluated at  , that the
domestic country affords to the foreign country – and hence which fix the market-clearing world price – must satisfy the
condition  .  Efficiency requires that the domestic government must be indifferent to such
changes, or that  , which yields (6). 
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GATT/WTO and the formal conditions for international efficiency presented above.
8  Hence, for a
particular world price  , the market access that the domestic country provides to the foreign
country under the domestic policy choices   is given by  .  Similarly,
for a particular world price  , the market access that the foreign country provides to the domestic
country under the foreign tariff choice   is given by  .  
With domestic and foreign market access defined, we may now interpret the efficiency
conditions (6)-(7).  If the domestic market access is evaluated at the market-clearing world price  ,
then, by the market-clearing condition (3), changes in domestic policies will preserve the market-
clearing world price if and only if they preserve domestic market access (evaluated at that market-
clearing world price).  Condition (6), then, may be interpreted as the domestic national efficiency
condition, since it requires the domestic government to be indifferent to small changes in   and 
which preserve the level of market access (evaluated at  ) that it provides to the foreign country.
9
Condition (7) may then be interpreted as the international efficiency condition which ensures that
the levels of domestic and foreign market access evaluated at  , and hence the equilibrium trade
volumes, are efficient. 
We next observe that, if the policy combination   satisfies efficiency conditions14
(6) and (7) and delivers  , then so too does the
policy combination   for any  .  By the market-clearing condition (3) and the
definitions of  ,   and  , these changes leave all (local and world) prices
unaffected, and therefore leave government welfare levels unaffected as well.  The national
efficiency condition can then be seen to continue to hold at the new policy combination by
substituting (4) into (6), while the international efficiency condition can be seen to continue to hold
by inspection of (7) and the definition of   and  .  Setting   equal to  ,   or   then
confirms that the domestic government possesses one redundant policy instrument: any one domestic
instrument can be set at an arbitrary level (e.g., laissez faire), and the remaining two domestic
instruments can be used in combination with the foreign tariff to achieve any efficient outcome that
is feasible when all instruments are freely chosen.  This again reflects the basic equivalence between
a tariff and a combination production subsidy/consumption tax. 
II.3: Nash Policies
We now characterize the Nash policy choices of the two governments.    To this end, we first
describe the best-response policy choices of the domestic government, given any foreign tariff  ,
which we denote by  .  The domestic government’s best-response policy
choices solve:
.




Using (4), it may be established that, if the three instruments are chosen to satisfy any two of (8a)-
(8c), then the remaining first-order condition is automatically satisfied, reflecting again the basic
equivalence between a tariff and a combination production subsidy/consumption tax.  As a
consequence, we may characterize the domestic government’s best-response policies as
corresponding to any triple   satisfying 
(9) , and
(10) .
Likewise, the best-response tariff choice of the foreign government, given any domestic
policies  , which we denote by  , solves 
.
The associated first-order condition is:  
(11) .
The set of Nash policy choices   are then the joint solutions to (9)-(11).
Comparing (9)-(11) to the efficiency conditions (6)-(7), it may be confirmed that Nash policy choices
satisfy the domestic national efficiency condition – that is, (9)-(10) imply (6) – but violate the
international efficiency condition – that is, (9)-(11) violate (7).  Therefore, the Nash policies are
inefficient for a single reason: they deliver inefficiently low levels of domestic and foreign market
access (see Bagwell and Staiger, 2001b, for a fuller development of this interpretation).  This
characterization of the Nash inefficiency allows in turn a succinct description of the “problem” that
the GATT/WTO can solve, namely, how to enable its member-governments to reach efficient
(higher) levels of market access, and thereby meet the international efficiency condition, without
disrupting their national efficiency conditions.16
II.4: The GATT/WTO Bargaining Frontier
In what follows we restrict attention to points on the international efficiency frontier at
which, with its trading partner’s policies fixed, each government would like to raise its own tariff.
This restricted attention seems appropriate given our focus on the GATT/WTO, where governments
evidently view their own tariff reductions as “concessions” to be offered only in exchange for
something of value (such as concessions of a reciprocal nature) from their trading partners.
Formally, we state this condition as:
(A1) .
In subsequent sections, when we ask whether various negotiating games can deliver efficient
outcomes, we will restrict attention to efficient outcomes which satisfy (A1).
Points on the efficiency frontier that satisfy (A1) exhibit as well two additional properties
that will prove useful for our analysis, and so we record these properties in a pair of lemmas.  To
establish the first property, we begin by observing that, at efficient points satisfying (A1), we cannot
have   or  : otherwise, governments would agree on the direction of movement
in a tariff which each would strictly prefer, and the initial policies could not then be efficient.
Moreover, as efficiency requires the tangency condition 
 ,
at efficient points satisfying (A1), we cannot have   or  .  Therefore, any
efficient policy combination that satisfies (A1) must also satisfy
 .
In addition, notice that  , and so with   it follows that
 implies  .  As a consequence, beginning from an efficient policy
combination   that satisfies (A1), any set of small changes in the policies of the17
domestic government   that reduce   from its implied level   will reduce
the welfare of the foreign government.  Under our global concavity assumption, we may therefore
record:
Lemma 1: Let   denote an efficient policy combination that satisfies (A1), and let
.  Then it follows that   for any
.
To establish the second property of efficient points implied by (A1), we use (4) and efficiency
condition (6) to derive that, on the efficiency frontier: 
,
which says that the domestic government must be indifferent to small changes in   and   that
preserve the market-clearing world price  .  An implication is that, with   and  ,
starting from any point on the efficiency frontier  .  But by (4), we also
have that 
,
and thus at a point on the efficiency frontier satisfying (A1), we must also have   and
.  As a consequence, beginning from an efficient policy combination   that
satisfies (A1), it follows that
   as  ,
and therefore that any set of small changes in the domestic policies of the domestic government 
that increase   from its implied level   will reduce the welfare of the domestic
government.  Combined with our finding above that  , we may therefore state under our18
global concavity assumption:
Lemma 2:  Let   denote an efficient policy combination that satisfies (A1), and let
 and   for any  ,   and  .  Then it follows that
 for any  ,   and 
implying .
Together, Lemmas 1 and 2 indicate that, beginning from an efficient combination of policies
that satisfy (A1): (i) the foreign government is hurt by any change in domestic policies that reduces
foreign access to domestic markets at the original world price; while (ii)  the domestic government
is hurt by (a) any change in its own domestic policies that increases foreign access to domestic
markets at the original world price, and/or (b) an increase in the foreign tariff.  These features will
turn out to be useful in our subsequent analysis of subsidy agreements.  We begin that analysis in the
next section.
III. The GATT Subsidy Rules
III.1 Institutional Background
Throughout GATT’s history, subsidies have posed perplexing and difficult issues for
international trade agreements.  Jackson (1989, p. 269) describes the issues this way:
“...the whole area of subsidy activity in international law, including the rules designed to constrain the use of subsidies
and the other rules designed to allow national governments the unilateral privilege of responding to subsidies with
countervailing duties, is not only extremely complex but holds the potential, if misapplied, of undermining the basic
policy goals of the post- World War II liberal trade system.  On the one hand, governments can use subsidies to evade
a liberal trade system by subsidizing so as to inhibit imports, or by subsidizing so as to enhance exports.  On the other
hand, responses to subsidies, particularly the unilateral national government response of countervailing duties, can be
implemented in such a way as to undermine liberal trade policies...”
In essence, while several attempts (such as the 1979 GATT Subsidies Code) were made to
strengthen GATT subsidy rules prior to the advent of the WTO, in effect governments remained
essentially free under GATT to offer production subsidies to their producers as they wished (possibly
subject to some reporting requirements).  The allowable responses to these production subsidies from10If the importing country’s tariff on that product were unbound, then it could respond to the subsidy with any
tariff level it wished, though in contrast to a countervailing duty (which would also be available to it) this tariff response
could not discriminate against imports of the product coming from the subsidizing country.  
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other governments under GATT rules were more restricted, and could in effect take one of two
forms, depending on whether the production subsidy was offered to exporting producers – and so
enhanced exports – or instead to import-competing producers – and so inhibited imports.  
If the subsidy was offered to exporting producers, then a government whose import-
competing producers experienced “material injury” on account of the subsidy (and whose import
tariff on that product was legally bound in a GATT agreement) could unilaterally impose an
additional “countervailing duty” (CVD) against the subsidized imports.  The magnitude of the CVD
response was limited to be no larger than the amount of the subsidy.
10  
If the subsidy was instead offered to import-competing producers, then as Petersmann (1997,
pp. 142-170) explains a government that had previously negotiated a tariff binding on that product
with the subsidizing government would have a legitimate basis for making a “non-violation
nullification-or-impairment” (NVNI) claim concerning its market access rights, under which the
subsidizing government would then be expected to make a policy adjustment that returned market
access to its original level (though the government would be under no obligation to remove the
subsidy).  More generally, in principle NVNI claims can be associated with any governmental
measure (e.g., consumption taxes), not just the introduction of new production subsidies, though as
Petersmann describes the role of NVNI claims has been most clearly established in GATT case law
as these claims relate to production subsidies.  Nevertheless, even when applied to subsidies, the
legal ambiguities associated with the notion of “non-violation” complaints are considerable, and
have made reliance on NVNI claims as a subsidy disciplining device controversial from the
beginning.  The resulting frustration has helped to fuel the long-standing attempts to reform subsidy
disciplines in the GATT/WTO. 
Against this institutional background, we now pose the following question: Could11Governments negotiate bindings on their tariffs in the GATT/WTO, and these bindings represent maximum
levels beyond which a government’s applied tariffs cannot legally rise.  For simplicity, and to focus on the main points,
we make no distinction between the applied tariffs and the bindings negotiated in stage 1 of the GATT Subsidy Game,
but this distinction can be introduced without altering our results.  We observe as well that, owing to the policy
redundancy noted above, if the foreign government had no ability to respond to the stage-2 domestic policy choices of
the domestic government (i.e., if there were no stage 3), then the domestic government would attain a point on its best-
response function with its stage-2 choices and an efficient combination of policies satisfying (A1) cannot be achieved.
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governments who negotiate tariff commitments and are then free to set their domestic subsidy/tax
instruments as they wish be expected to achieve policy outcomes on the international efficiency
frontier, when they are permitted to respond to production subsidies (and in the case of NVNI claims,
consumption taxes as well) as we have described these allowable responses just above?  To answer
this question, we next define a negotiation game that captures the features described above. 
The general features of the GATT Subsidy Game are as follows:
Stage 1: The domestic and foreign governments negotiate tariff levels  , and a stage-1 market-
clearing world price   is implied by   and the existing domestic
subsidy and tax policies  . 
Stage 2: The domestic government chooses domestic policies  , and a stage-2 market-clearing
world price   is implied. 
Stage 3: If the conditions for an NVNI claim are met, then the foreign government chooses whether
or not to make an NVNI claim; if the conditions for a CVD response are met, then the
foreign government chooses whether or not to impose a CVD.
In effect, the GATT Subsidy Game has the two governments negotiating over tariffs, with
the domestic government then free to set unilaterally its domestic production subsidy and
consumption tax levels, and the foreign government free to respond to the domestic policy choices
within the limits established by GATT rules.
11  In the next subsection, we further develop the specific
features of the GATT Subsidy Game, and derive a benchmark result. 12We model NVNI claims here as preserving the level of market access commitments implied by tariff
negotiations.  More accurately, in combination with renegotiation rights the NVNI claims operate to preserve the balance
of market access commitments implied by tariff negotiations.  We discuss the extension of our results to this more
complicated setting in the concluding section.
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III.2 The Efficiency of Outcomes under GATT Subsidy Rules
We begin our analysis of the GATT Subsidy Game by considering in more detail the
implications of GATT rules for the allowable responses of the foreign government in stage 3.
Consider first the condition for an NVNI claim.  As described in the previous subsection, a
legitimate basis for an NVNI claim by the foreign government arises whenever the domestic
government has bound a tariff in a GATT negotiation with the foreign government, and then
subsequently alters its domestic policies in a way that diminishes the market access implied by that
original tariff negotiation.  
To formalize this condition, let us define the domestic market access implied by the stage-1
tariff negotiation as the domestic import volume implied by the stage-1 tariff choice and the existing
domestic subsidy and tax policies, evaluated at the market-clearing world price implied in stage 1,
or  .  Next, we define the domestic market access implied by the stage-2
policy choices as the domestic import volume implied by the stage-1 tariff choice and the stage-2
domestic subsidy and tax policy choices,  evaluated again at the market-clearing world price implied
in stage 1, or  .  With these definitions of implied market access, it may
then be said that a legitimate basis for an NVNI claim by the foreign government arises if and only
if  .  But using the market-clearing
condition (3) and the Marshall-Lerner stability condition, this condition is equivalent to  .
To see when the foreign government would choose to exercise an opportunity to make a
legitimate NVNI claim, we first observe that the domestic government would be expected under a
legitimate NVNI claim to make a policy adjustment that returned market access to its original level.
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Following a successful NVNI claim, then, we allow the domestic government to select its preferred 
consistent with the original market access level.  But by (3), it may now also be observed that the
effect of a legitimate NVNI claim is to return the market-clearing world price to its implied stage-1
level  .  As a consequence, the foreign government gains from exercising a right to make an NVNI
claim if and only if  .
We may therefore state:
Lemma 3: The foreign government makes an NVNI claim in stage 3 of the GATT Subsidy Game
if and only if (i)  , and (ii)  . 
Consider next the condition for a CVD response.  As described in the previous subsection,
under GATT rules the foreign government can unilaterally impose a CVD (up to the level of the
domestic subsidy) on imports from the domestic country whenever it can establish that its import-
competing industry suffers material injury as a result of a subsidy offered by the domestic
government to domestic exporting firms.  We formalize this by requiring that, for a foreign CVD
response to be permissible, the domestic government must have with its stage-2 choice increased the
production subsidy it offers to its exporting firms relative to the stage-1 level, and the implied output
in the foreign import-competing sector must contract between stages 1 and 2 as a result.  In our
general equilibrium setting, a production subsidy offered to domestic exporting firms implies  ,
and a rise in the production subsidy offered to the domestic exporting firms implies  , while
the implied output of the foreign import-competing sector will contract between stages 1 and 2 if and
only if  , which is equivalent to  . 
To see when the foreign government would choose to exercise an opportunity to impose a
CVD, we need simply observe that it will choose to do so if and only if its tariff is bound below its
best-response level, or  .23
We may therefore state:
Lemma 4: The foreign government chooses to impose a CVD in stage 3 of the GATT Subsidy Game
if and only if (i)   and  , and (ii)  . 
With the foreign government’s stage-3 responses in the GATT Subsidy Game characterized
by Lemmas 3 and 4, we now ask whether the GATT Subsidy Game can deliver efficient outcomes.
To explore this possibility, we follow Bagwell and Staiger (2001b) and ask whether points on the
efficiency frontier can be reached with appropriate stage-1 outcomes, in light of the subsequent
(stage-2 and stage-3) outcomes that may be anticipated.  Given the existing production and
consumption policies of the domestic government, we will say that a particular pair of payoffs for
the domestic and foreign governments can be implemented under GATT tariff negotiations if there
exists a pair of negotiated tariff levels   such that this payoff pair corresponds to a Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SGPE) of stages 2 and 3 of the GATT Subsidy Game.
Consider, then, any efficient policy combination   that also satisfies (A1).  As
we observed in section II.2, the efficient payoffs associated with   can be equivalently
delivered with the alternative (efficient) policy combination    for any  .
Define  , and define   implicitly by  .  In words,  is
the domestic tariff level that, in combination with the foreign tariff   and the existing domestic
subsidy and tax policies  , implies the market-clearing world price  .  Finally, let  .
Then the efficient policy combination   is equivalent to the alternative (efficient) policy
combination .
Now suppose that stage-1 negotiations result in the tariff pair  , so that the
market access levels implied by these initial choices are efficient and the implied stage-1 market-13In response to an NVNI claim, the domestic government could also adjust (reduce) its tariff, but the policy
equivalence between the tariff and the domestic production subsidy/consumption tax policies allows us to focus on
adjustments to   with no loss of generality.    
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clearing world price is  .  Consider the domestic government’s stage-2 problem.  If it selects
, then it has selected an efficient mix of policies to deliver its efficient market
access level, the implied stage-2 market-clearing world price is  , and by Lemmas 3 and
4 there can be no stage-3 response from the foreign government.  Hence, if the domestic
government’s stage-2 choice is  , then the welfare levels associated with the
efficient policy combination   will be implemented.
Suppose, though, that the domestic government’s stage-2 choice is  .
Then there are three possibilities.  A first possibility is that, under the alternative stage-2 choice, the
domestic market access level remains unchanged so that it is still true that  , and
therefore by Lemmas 3 and 4 it is still the case that there can be no stage-3 response from the foreign
government.  But then the foreign government is indifferent between   and
, so that a strict preference for   by the domestic government would be
inconsistent with the efficiency of  , i.e., it would be inconsistent with the national
efficiency condition (6).  A second possibility is that, under the alternative stage-2 choice, the
domestic market access level is reduced, so that  .  But then by Lemmas 1 and 3, the
foreign government will choose in stage 3 to make an NVNI claim, and the domestic government
must then select its preferred   consistent with  , and can do no better
than to select the (efficient) combination  .
13  The third and final possibility is that,
under the alternative stage-2 choice, the domestic market access level is increased, so that
.  Under this possibility, there can be no stage-3 NVNI claim by Lemma 3.  By Lemma14Comparing Proposition 1 to the results of Bagwell and Staiger (2001b, Proposition 3), it may be seen that the
NVNI claim is a more comprehensively effective tool for achieving international efficiency with tariff negotiations when
governments make unilateral subsidy choices than when they make unilateral labor/environmental standards choices.
The distinction arises because of the equivalence relation between tariffs and combination production
subsidies/consumption taxes and the policy redundancy that follows.  This policy redundancy is not present in the context
of standards.  As we observe in section V below, when this redundancy is removed, the comprehensive ability of NVNI
claims in combination with tariff negotiations to deliver governments to the international efficiency frontier is weakened.
(See also note 21 below).  
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4 there might be a stage-3 CVD imposed by the foreign government, and with   this would
have the effect of increasing   further above  .  But in any event, by Lemma 2 the domestic
government cannot achieve higher welfare under this (higher  ) possibility. 
Hence we may state:
Proposition 1: Any point on the efficiency frontier that satisfies (A1) can be implemented under
GATT tariff negotiations. 
Proposition 1 asserts that the GATT-permissible responses to production subsidies (and
consumption taxes) are sufficient to allow internationally efficient outcomes to be achieved with
negotiations over tariffs alone.
14  Since, according to Proposition 1, any point on the efficiency
frontier that satisfies (A1) can be implemented under GATT tariff negotiations, it follows that any
(frictionless) stage-1 bargaining procedure over tariffs will achieve an internationally efficient policy
outcome.  Intuitively, the rules that delineate the permissible responses evidently strike the right
balance between, on the one hand, providing governments with the responses necessary to prevent
their trading partners from making domestic policy choices that would preclude attainment of the
international efficiency frontier and, on the other hand, not being so permissive as to allow the
responses themselves to become the impediment to efficient outcomes. 
Interestingly, as the arguments leading up to Proposition 1 reveal, there is an important role
for the possibility of NVNI claims in supporting efficient negotiating outcomes, but there appears
to be no need for the possibility of CVD responses to guide governments to the efficiency frontier
(that is, the possibility of a stage-3 CVD response could be made costly or even removed from the15If more than one value of   exists, then we define   to be the lowest such value.
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GATT Subsidy Game entirely without altering the validity of Proposition 1).  But in light of the role
played by NVNI claims in supporting efficient outcomes in the GATT Subsidy Game, it is important
to ask whether this role would be diminished or even eliminated once the costs of bringing a
successful NVNI claim are introduced.  After all, as we observed in section III.1, the many attempts
to impose further disciplines on the use of subsidies which culminated in the WTO Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures can be interpreted as reflecting in large part the frustration
associated with the high costs of using the legally ambiguous NVNI claim for this purpose.  We
therefore turn in the next subsection to consider the implications for Proposition 1 of introducing a
cost to the NVNI claim.  
III.3 Costly NVNI and the Efficiency of Outcomes under GATT Subsidy Rules
We maintain our fucus on the GATT Subsidy Game, but now introduce a cost to making an
NVNI claim.  We assume that the cost is borne by the claimant (i.e., the foreign government), and
depict the welfare level of the foreign government as   when it makes an NVNI
claim and faces local foreign prices   and market-clearing world price  .  We will say that the
NVNI claim is costly if and only if   at all prices   and  .  An
NVNI claim is costless if and only if   at all prices   and  .  
The only limit we place on the magnitude of the NVNI cost is as follows.  For any efficient
combination of policies   which also satisfy (A1), and with  , we
assume that there exists a   satisfying  .
15  Our
assumption on the allowable magnitude of NVNI cost implies that the cost of NVNI cannot be so
high that there is no level of   that would make the foreign government indifferent between, on
the one hand, paying the NVNI cost and trading at the terms of trade  , and on the other hand,16This follows from our definition of   and Lemma 1.
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not paying the NVNI cost but trading at the terms of trade  .  If NVNI is costless, then
,
and so costless NVNI implies  .
16  When NVNI is costly, we have that 
,
and so costly NVNI implies by Lemma 1 that  .  
In any event, recalling now that we also have 
for any   by Lemma 1, it follows that, whether or not NVNI is costly, 
for any  .  We may therefore state:
Lemma 5: Let   denote an efficient policy combination that satisfies (A1), let
, and let   be defined by  .
Then   for any  .
Introducing a cost to making an NVNI claim alters our previous analysis of the GATT
Subsidy Game in only one way: the condition under which the foreign government gains from
exercising a right to make an NVNI claim must be reconsidered.  As before, the domestic
government would be expected under a legitimate NVNI claim to make a policy adjustment that
returned market access to its original level.  Provided that the foreign export supply function is not28
altered by the costs of making an NVNI claim (by for example diverting resources from production
of the export good to developing the NVNI claim), it again follows by (3) that the effect of a
legitimate NVNI claim is to return the market-clearing world price to its implied stage-1 level  .
To simplify and focus on the main point, we assume that the foreign export supply function is indeed
invariant to the filing of an NVNI claim, so that the effect of a legitimate NVNI claim is to return
the market-clearing world price to its implied stage-1 level  .  Hence, the foreign government gains
from making an NVNI claim if and only if  .  We
may therefore state:
Lemma 6: The foreign government makes a costly NVNI claim in stage 3 of the GATT Subsidy
Game if and only if (i)  , and (ii)  . 
As we continue to assume that a CVD response is costless, Lemma 4 continues to
characterize the circumstances under which the foreign government chooses to impose a CVD in
stage 3 of the GATT Subsidy Game.  Armed with Lemmas 4, 5 and 6, we may now ask whether the
GATT Subsidy Game can deliver efficient outcomes when the NVNI claim is costly.  
Consider, then, any efficient policy combination   that also satisfies (A1).
Define   implicitly by  , and let  .  In words,  is the domestic tariff
level that, in combination with the foreign tariff   and the existing domestic subsidy and tax
policies  , implies the market-clearing world price  .  Then the efficient policy combination
 is equivalent to the alternative (efficient) policy combination  . 
Now suppose that stage-1 negotiations result in the tariff pair  , so that the
implied stage-1 market-clearing world price is then  .  Notice that when NVNI is costly,29
 and so these stage-1 negotiations result in the domestic government offering to bind its tariff
at a level that implies a greater level of market access at   than is efficient.  Consider the domestic
government’s stage-2 problem.  If it selects  , then its domestic policy choices have
reduced its market access to the efficient level at  , and the implied stage-2 market-clearing world
price is  , with   and hence   when NVNI is costly.  By Lemma 4, then, there
can be no stage-3 CVD response from the foreign government.  And by Lemma 6, while the foreign
government has a legitimate NVNI claim, the definition of   ensures that it will choose not to
make an NVNI claim against the domestic government.  Hence, if the domestic government’s stage-
2 choice is  , then the welfare levels associated with the efficient policy
combination   will be implemented.
To see that the domestic government cannot do better with an alternative stage-2 selection,
suppose that the domestic government’s stage-2 choice is  .  Then there are
three possibilities.  A first possibility is that, under the alternative stage-2 choice, domestic market
access remains at its efficient level, so that it is still true that  .  But then the foreign
government is indifferent between   and  , so that a strict preference
for   by the domestic government would be inconsistent with the efficiency of
.  A second possibility is that, under the alternative stage-2 choice, domestic market
access is reduced below its efficient level, so that  .  But then by Lemmas 5 and 6, the foreign
government will choose in stage 3 to make an NVNI claim, and the domestic government must then
select its preferred   consistent with  , which by Lemma 2 implies that the17As in the case of costless NVNI analyzed in section III.2, in response to an NVNI claim, the domestic
government could also adjust (reduce) its tariff, but the policy equivalence between the tariff and the domestic production
subsidy/consumption tax policies allows us to focus on adjustments to   with no loss of generality. 
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domestic government then does strictly worse.
17  The third and final possibility is that, under the
alternative stage-2 choice, domestic market access is maintained above its efficient level, so that
.  But whether or not there is a (NVNI or CVD) response from the foreign government, under
this third  possibility the domestic government must face a market-clearing world price higher than
, and by Lemma 2 therefore does strictly worse.  
Hence we may state:
Proposition 2: Whether or not NVNI claims are costly, any point on the efficiency frontier that
satisfies (A1) can be implemented under GATT tariff negotiations.
According to Proposition 2, the costs of making an NVNI claim can potentially be quite high
without interfering with the ability of governments to implement efficient policy combinations under
GATT tariff negotiations.  Intuitively, the redundancy of policy instruments indicated by the
possibility of using tariffs, production subsidies and consumption taxes allows governments to
position tariffs in their negotiations so as to imply a level of market access which yields an NVNI
“trigger point” at the efficient level of market access.  Subsequent to these negotiations, the level of
market access is then allowed to “slip” back to this trigger point through the unilateral choice of
domestic subsidy and tax policies – and the redundancy of policy instruments ensures that the
national efficiency condition is not disrupted in the process – but the threat of NVNI beyond this
point keeps market access levels from falling below their efficient levels.  
An implication of Proposition 2's assertion that GATT subsidy rules can continue to deliver
internationally efficient policy outcomes even when the (potentially very high) costs of NVNI claims
are acknowledged is that the subsidy rules of the WTO cannot possibly mark an improvement in
terms of international efficiency.  Clearly, the redundancy of policy instruments implied by the18The ultimate goal of the WTO Agriculture Agreement with regard to subsidies is similar to the SCM
Agreement, though the former adopts a more gradual and staged approach than the latter.  The three new features that
we emphasize in our discussion of the SCM Agreement are also present in the Agriculture Agreement.   
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ability of the domestic government to choose tariffs, production subsidies and consumption taxes
is important for the result of Proposition 2, and hence important for this implication.  If it is assumed,
for example, that the domestic government does not have a consumption tax at its disposal, then
positioning tariffs to achieve an “efficient”  NVNI trigger point will disrupt the national efficiency
condition, and points on the international efficiency frontier will in general no longer be attainable
under GATT subsidy rules as we have modeled them.  We will return to consider this possibility in
section V, and ask under what conditions the subsidy rules of the WTO might be interpreted as an
improvement over the rules of GATT.  However, before doing that, we turn in the next section to
consider the impact of the WTO subsidy rules on policy outcomes when governments have available
a sufficiently rich set of instruments to afford a degree of policy redundancy.  
IV.  The WTO Subsidy Rules 
IV.1 Institutional Background
As described in section II.1, from early in its history, governments were dissatisfied with the
treatment of subsidies within GATT.  This dissatisfaction led to the negotiation of increasingly
stringent rules in an attempt to discipline the use of subsidies.  The 1979 GATT Subsidies Code
negotiated in the Tokyo Round was an attempt to strengthen GATT rules on subsidies, and the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) and the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture represent attempts to bring further teeth to subsidy disciplines within the WTO.  In light
of our above findings, the WTO attempts to discipline domestic subsidies which are embodied in
the SCM and Agriculture Agreements are particularly noteworthy, because these agreements depart
in several important ways from the basic features that are associated with reliance on NVNI claims
as a way to discipline subsidies, features that receive formal support under Propositions 1 and 2.  
Focusing on the SCM Agreement, we may identify three key differences in the way domestic
subsidies are treated under this agreement relative to their treatment in non-violation complaints. 
1819Lawrence (2003, pp. 54-60) emphasizes the new “compliance” orientation of the WTO subsidy rules as
marking a fundamental shift from the traditional  “concession rebalancing” orientation of the GATT.
20A fourth important difference is the “specificity” requirement that a subsidy must meet to be challenged under
the SCM Agreement.  As the x-sector production subsidy that we consider would satisfy this requirement automatically,
we do not emphasize this difference here, though in practice the requirement of specificity is considered to be the critical
“gateway” to the SCM provisions.  
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First, a subsidy that is successfully challenged under the SCM Agreement must be removed to
achieve compliance (i.e., subsidy complaints under the SCM Agreement are “violation” complaints),
whereas under an NVNI claim the subsidizing government would simply be expected to make a
policy adjustment that returned market access to its original level – it would be under no obligation
to remove the subsidy.
19  Second, there is no distinction in the SCM Agreement between “new”
subsidies and subsidies that were known to exist at the time of market access negotiations.  And
third, there is no requirement that a government challenging a subsidy under the SCM Agreement
had previously negotiated a tariff commitment with the defendant government.  Together, these three
differences sever the link between subsidies that may be challenged within the WTO and the
presence of previously negotiated market access commitments, and imply that any government has
the right to challenge – and, in principle, force the removal of – any positive subsidy.
20
To capture the additional features embodied in the WTO subsidy rules, we introduce into the
GATT Subsidy Game the ability to challenge a subsidy afforded under the SCM Agreement.  We
accomplish this by inserting a new stage, between stages 2 and 3 of the GATT Subsidy Game, in
which the foreign government may choose to challenge a domestic subsidy under the SCM
Agreement.    
The general features of this augmented game, which we refer to as the WTO Subsidy Game,
are as follows:
Stage 1: The domestic and foreign governments negotiate tariff levels  , and a stage-1 market-
clearing world price   is implied by   and the existing domestic
subsidy and tax policies  . 33
Stage 2: The domestic government chooses domestic policies  , and a stage-2 market-clearing
world price   is implied.
Stage 3: If  , then the foreign government chooses whether or not to challenge the subsidy under
the SCM Agreement.  If the subsidy is challenged, then  , and the domestic government
may choose again its domestic tax  .
Stage 4: If the conditions for an NVNI claim are met, then the foreign government chooses whether
or not to make an NVNI claim; if the conditions for a CVD response are met, then the
foreign government chooses whether or not to impose a CVD.
In effect, as compared with the GATT Subsidy Game, the WTO Subsidy Game introduces
an option for the foreign government to choose to have a positive domestic subsidy removed with
an SCM challenge, rather than respond to the subsidy with an NVNI claim or a CVD.  Clearly, if this
option is not exercised, then analysis of stage 4 of the WTO Subsidy Game proceeds exactly as the
analysis of the equivalent stage 3 of the GATT Subsidy Game, and each of the earlier Lemmas
continues to apply.  On the other hand, if an SCM challenge is brought in stage 3 of the WTO
Subsidy Game, then with the elimination of the subsidy there will be no possibility for a CVD
response in stage 4, though it is still possible that an NVNI claim could be made.  We now turn in
the next subsection to consider the impact of the WTO Subsidy Rules on negotiating outcomes.  
IV.2 The (In)Efficiency of Outcomes under WTO Subsidy Rules
We continue to allow that an NVNI claim is costly, but we carry out our analysis of the WTO
Subsidy Game under the assumption that there is no cost to challenging a subsidy under the SCM
Agreement.  In analogy with our analysis of the GATT Subsidy Game, given the existing production
and consumption policies of the domestic government, we will say that a particular pair of payoffs
for the domestic and foreign governments can be implemented under WTO tariff negotiations if there
exists a pair of negotiated tariff levels   such that this payoff pair corresponds to a Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SGPE) of stages 2-4 of the WTO Subsidy Game.34
We first consider whether the stage-1 negotiating outcome that implements an efficient policy
combination under GATT tariff negotiations can implement this efficient policy combination under
WTO tariff negotiations as well.  Consider, then, any efficient policy combination 
that also satisfies (A1).  Defining   implicitly by  , recalling that   satisfies
, and letting  , we observed previously
that   is equivalent to the alternative (efficient) policy combination  ,
and that the stage-1 negotiating outcome of   would implement this efficient policy
combination under GATT tariff negotiations (leading to Proposition 2).  
Now suppose that stage-1 negotiations in the WTO Subsidy Game result in the tariff pair
, so that the implied stage-1 market-clearing world price is then  .  Consider
the domestic government’s stage-2 problem.  If it selects   and the foreign
government chooses in stage 3 not to challenge the subsidy under the SCM Agreement, then as with
the GATT Subsidy Game the welfare levels associated with the efficient policy combination
 will be implemented.  Moreover, any alternative stage-2 choice that does not elicit
a stage-3 challenge under the SCM Agreement cannot be preferred by the domestic government, by
arguments exactly analogous to those made in the context of the GATT Subsidy Game.  Finally, the
domestic government cannot gain from an alternative stage-2 choice that does elicit a stage-3
challenge under the SCM Agreement, since doing so simply restricts the level of   to 1, from which
arguments exactly analogous to those made in the context of the GATT Subsidy Game again apply.
Hence, the key question is whether or not a stage-1 negotiating outcome of  ,
followed by a stage-2 selection of  , will elicit a stage-3 challenge of the subsidy
under the SCM Agreement.  If the foreign government chooses not to bring an SCM challenge in
stage 3, then the efficient policies will be implemented and its payoff is  .  If
the foreign government chooses to bring an SCM challenge in stage 3, then the efficient policies will35
not be implemented, but its payoff will differ from   only if the resulting
market-clearing world price is greater than  .  This can be seen as follows: since the SCM
challenge sets  , there can be no CVD response in stage 4; if the resulting market-clearing world
price is equal to  , then there is no stage-4 (NVNI or CVD) response and the foreign payoff is
; if the resulting market-clearing world price is less than  , then a stage-4
NVNI claim is triggered and foreign welfare is  .
Fixing   and noting that   varies with  , we observe first that, if
 but small, then the restriction to   implied by an SCM challenge will be met by an
increase in   from the domestic government that preserves the implied market-clearing world price
at  , and the foreign government cannot gain from an SCM challenge in this circumstance.  This
follows because a reduction in   (from a small   to  ) raises the implied market-
clearing world price by  , thereby causing a loss in domestic welfare by Lemma 2, but the
national efficiency condition (6) ensures that the domestic government can avoid this (first-order)
loss with an increase in   that maintains the market-clearing world price at  .  On the other hand,
for   and sufficiently large, our global concavity assumption ensures that the restriction to
 implied by an SCM challenge will not be met by an increase in   from the domestic
government that is sufficient to preserve the implied world price at  , at least for 
where the domestic government is positioned near its best-response policies: with   sufficiently
large, the increase in   required to preserve the implied market-clearing world price at   when
the restriction   is imposed can be made arbitrarily large; and therefore under global concavity
and with   placing the domestic government close to its best-response policies, a
sufficiently large   ensures that, when   is imposed and beginning from a level of   that implies
a market-clearing world price slightly above  , the cost of raising   slightly to achieve   is not
worth incurring for the domestic government. 36
For   and sufficiently large, then, the market-clearing world price resulting from
an SCM challenge is greater than  , at least for efficient policies that position the domestic
government near its best-response policies.  Provided the increase in   is not too large, which is
guaranteed provided that   is not too large, the foreign government must then gain from the
SCM challenge (as an implication of (A1)), and the efficient policies will not be implemented with
a stage-1 negotiating outcome of  .    
Finally, we observe that, when the stage-1 negotiating outcome of   fails to
implement the efficient policy combination   in the WTO Subsidy Game, there can be
no other stage-1 negotiating outcome that will work.  This is because   must be set so as to provide
the appropriate NVNI trigger, tying down the unique combination of policies that yield the welfare
levels implied by  , i.e., the requirements of NVNI imply that there is no policy
redundancy that can be exploited to meet the demands for achieving efficiency.  We therefore state:
Proposition 3: Whether or not NVNI claims are costly, there exists a range of outcomes on the
international efficiency frontier satisfying (A1) that cannot be implemented under WTO tariff
negotiations. 
When viewed together, Propositions 2 and 3 suggest that the subsidy rules embodied in the
WTO SCM Agreement represent a step backward relative to the GATT subsidy rules.  In effect, the
available policy instruments are just sufficient to allow governments to meet the demands for
efficient outcomes in the GATT Subsidy Game.  When the additional restrictions on the use of
subsidies embodied in the SCM Agreement are introduced, the available instruments are insufficient
to meet the added demands for efficient outcomes – at least over a range of outcomes on the
international efficiency frontier – in the resulting WTO Subsidy Game.  
V. Limited Domestic Policy Instruments
Until now we have maintained the assumption that the domestic government possesses a set21When NVNI is costless it can be shown, arguing in an analogous fashion to Bagwell and Staiger (2001b,
Proposition 3), that there exist some points on the efficiency frontier that can be implemented under GATT tariff
negotiations by positioning negotiated tariffs appropriately and then triggering an NVNI claim with subsequent changes
to the domestic subsidy, but there exist other efficient points that cannot be implemented under GATT tariff negotiations.
By focusing on the case where NVNI is costly, we highlight that costly NVNI – in combination with limited domestic
instruments – ensures that no efficient outcomes can be reached under GATT subsidy rules, and this focus therefore
provides a natural benchmark from which to evaluate whether WTO subsidy rules mark an improvement.    
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of policy instruments that is sufficiently rich to exhibit a degree of redundancy, and we have
observed that this policy redundancy plays a potentially important role in facilitating internationally
efficient outcomes under GATT subsidy rules.  We now consider a world in which the policy
redundancy featured in the previous sections does not arise.  Specifically, we assume in this section
that the domestic government has a tariff and a domestic production subsidy at its disposal, but we
now eliminate the domestic consumption tax (i.e., we set  ).  This restriction on policy
instruments can be interpreted as representing a  limitation that governments may face when they
attempt to offset – with adjustments in their domestic policies – the effects of international
constraints on policy instruments imposed as a result of GATT/WTO commitments.  
Owing to the initial policy redundancy, this restriction, of course, does not alter the welfare
combinations that correspond to the efficiency frontier as characterized in section II.2, and it does
not alter the Nash welfare levels as characterized in section II.3, though it does imply that a unique
combination of policies will now be associated with each of these welfare combinations.  Moreover,
it is straightforward to confirm that Lemmas 1-6 continue to hold when  .  But as we next
demonstrate, the elimination of policy redundancy has important implications for the efficiency
properties of outcomes under GATT and WTO subsidy rules.
V.1 GATT Subsidy Rules in a Limited-Instrument Environment
We consider first the efficiency properties of the outcomes of the GATT Subsidy Game in
the presence of limited domestic policy instruments, concentrating on the case in which NVNI is
costly.
21  Obviously when NVNI is costly, the efficiency frontier cannot be attained if an NVNI claim
is filed.  Hence, we need only ask whether a point on the efficiency frontier satisfying (A1) could be
implemented under GATT tariff negotiations when an NVNI claim is not triggered.  Suppose, then,38
that an efficient combination of policies satisfying (A1) has been reached as the outcome of the
GATT Subsidy Game.  There are two possible paths to this outcome, corresponding to whether a
CVD response was triggered or not.  
If a CVD response was triggered in the process of reaching an efficient outcome, then by
Lemma 4 we have that  , and by Lemma 6 it then follows that a small increase in   above 
would not trigger an NVNI response from the foreign government, and would lead to a reduction of 
below   under the permissible CVD response (i.e., letting   denote the CVD response,
).  But then the domestic government gains from deviating to  , since at an efficient
point satisfying (A1) we have   and  .  Therefore, an efficient
combination of policies satisfying (A1) cannot be reached as the outcome of the GATT Subsidy
Game in a limited-instrument costly-NVNI environment when a CVD response is triggered.  
The remaining possibility is that a CVD response is not triggered.  In this case, if an efficient
combination of policies is to be reached as the outcome of the GATT Subsidy Game, the efficient
tariffs   and   must be chosen in stage 1.  Moreover, owing to the lack of policy redundancy,
as we observed above there is now a unique combination of policies associated with any point on
the efficiency frontier.  Hence, in light of the domestic production subsidy   that exists at the time
of the stage-1 choices, a unique stage-1 market clearing price of   is implied, with
the unique stage-2 market clearing price then given by  .  Finally, recalling the
definition of   and observing that it is a function of  ,   and  , it follows (generically) that
the implied  .  But using Lemmas 5 and 6, we then have that either an NVNI response would
be triggered along this path to the efficient policy combination, thereby precluding efficiency, or that
the domestic government could deviate from the efficient policy combination to   without
triggering an NVNI response from the foreign government and thereby gain.  Therefore, an efficient39
combination of policies satisfying (A1) cannot be reached as the outcome of the GATT Subsidy
Game in a limited-instrument costly-NVNI environment when a CVD response is not triggered.  
As a consequence of these arguments, we may state:
Proposition 4: In the presence of limited domestic policy instruments and costly NVNI claims, there
does not exist (generically) a point on the efficiency frontier satisfying (A1) that can be implemented
under GATT tariff negotiations.
In effect, as a comparison of Propositions 2 and 4 makes clear, a level of policy redundancy
is required to achieve efficient outcomes under GATT tariff negotiations when NVNI is costly: when
the set of domestic policy instruments is limited and this redundancy is not present (and NVNI is
costly), there are too few instruments for governments to orchestrate a movement from inefficient
Nash policies to a place on the efficiency frontier under GATT subsidy rules.  Notice, too, that the
inability to reach efficient outcomes stems from the ineffectiveness of the “disciplines” placed on
the use of subsidies by costly NVNI claims in the presence of limited domestic policy instruments.
This gives rise to the possibility that alternative disciplines on subsidies, such as those embodied in
the SCM Agreement, could be “more effective,” and as such facilitate more efficient outcomes.   
V.2 WTO Subsidy Rules in a Limited Instrument Environment
We consider next the efficiency properties of the outcomes of the WTO Subsidy Game in the
presence of limited domestic policy instruments and costly NVNI claims.  More specifically, in light
of the (generic) inability of GATT subsidy rules to permit governments to achieve efficient outcomes
through tariff negotiations in this environment, we may ask whether WTO subsidy rules might mark
an improvement under some circumstances.  As we next demonstrate, WTO subsidy rules are sure
to lead to more efficient outcomes than GATT subsidy rules in a limited-instrument costly-NVNI
environment when the use of subsidies is of sufficiently minor importance on the efficiency frontier.
To see that WTO subsidy rules must lead to more efficient outcomes than GATT subsidy
rules in this environment when the use of subsidies is of sufficiently minor importance on the40
efficiency frontier, consider the extreme case in which there is no role for a domestic production
subsidy at any point on the international efficiency frontier.  This would be true, for example, if the
domestic government’s objective were simply to maximize the real value of national income, and
there were no distortions in the domestic economy.  In this case, any point on the efficiency frontier
consistent with (A1) can be implemented under WTO tariff negotiations, by simply negotiating in
stage 1 to the efficient tariffs   and   associated with the desired point on the efficiency frontier:
by challenging any   under the SCM Agreement, the foreign government can guarantee that the
efficient point will be implemented; and by the efficiency of  , the domestic government cannot
find a   that is both preferred by it and preferred by the foreign government (and therefore not
challenged under the SCM Agreement).  Since (generically) no point on the efficiency frontier
consistent with (A1) can be implemented under GATT tariff negotiations in this environment
according to Proposition 4, we may state:
Proposition 5: In the presence of limited domestic policy instruments and costly NVNI claims,
WTO subsidy rules must lead to more efficient outcomes than GATT subsidy rules when the use of
subsidies is of sufficiently minor importance on the efficiency frontier.
In effect, if domestic subsidies have no legitimate reason to exist in an internationally
efficient policy environment, then, by allowing these subsidies to be challenged and removed, the
“more effective” discipline introduced under the WTO SCM Agreement is sure to be efficiency
enhancing relative to the weaker subsidy disciplines embodied in GATT rules in a limited-instrument
costly-NVNI environment.  In this way, Proposition 5 identifies a set of circumstances under which
WTO subsidy rules can be said to mark an improvement over GATT subsidy rules.  It is notable,
however, that these circumstances are strikingly at odds with the views expressed by GATT/WTO
member governments concerning the legitimate role of subsidies in the pursuit of important public
policy objectives (see note 3).     
Whether WTO subsidy rules can be said to mark an improvement over GATT subsidy rules
in this environment when subsidies are seen as legitimate instruments of public policy is more22Intuitively, this reflects the fact that terms-of-trade manipulation is the source of international inefficiency in
this setting, and the gains from terms-of-trade manipulation go to zero as trade volumes approach zero.  Formally, this
can be seen as follows.  As noted in section II.1, our restriction on government preferences embodied in (5) reflects the
assumption that governments like transfers of revenue from their trading partners.  However, the revenue transfer implied
by a small terms-of-trade improvement is given simply by the import volume, and so   and   approach zero as
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difficult to establish, and presumably depends on circumstances.  On the one hand, the heightened
ability to challenge and remove subsidies that erode market access commitments can further the goal
of international efficiency.  On the other hand, where subsidies have a legitimate purpose in an
internationally efficient policy environment, the ability to challenge and remove them can run
counter to the goal of international efficiency.  At a general level, then, whether or not the WTO
subsidy rules mark an improvement over GATT subsidy rules in this limited-instrument costly-
NVNI environment will depend on the relative importance of these two forces. 
However, we next demonstrate that, at least in the case where the domestic government seeks
to intervene on behalf of its import-competing producers, if the efficiency loss from the elimination
of subsidies as a policy instrument is sufficiently important relative to the potential efficiency gain
from international negotiations, then outcomes under WTO subsidy rules are surely less efficient
than outcomes under GATT subsidy rules in this limited-instrument costly-NVNI environment.  This
is because, in these circumstances, and as a result of the imperfect substitutability between
production subsidies offered to import-competing producers and tariffs, the WTO subsidy rules
completely undermine the ability of tariff negotiations to serve as the mechanism for expanding
market access to more efficient levels, the stage-1 negotiations in the WTO Subsidy Game must end
in disagreement, and governments are resigned to their Nash payoffs.      
To establish this point, it suffices to consider a case in which the Nash policy choices lead
to a small but strictly positive Nash trade volume, and where each point on the efficiency frontier
entails a sufficiently large domestic production subsidy offered to domestic import-competing
producers (i.e.,  ).  When Nash trade volumes are small but positive, the Nash payoffs lie
close to the efficiency frontier, and approach the efficiency frontier from below for Nash trade
volumes that approach zero.
22  In this case, then, the potential efficiency gain from internationaltrade volumes approach zero.  With this, it may be confirmed that the Nash conditions (9)-(11) correspond to the
efficiency conditions (6)-(7) in the limit when Nash trade volumes approach zero. 
23In the case of rejection, there is also no longer an accompanying NVNI right for the foreign government, but
this is not relevant for the argument that follows.
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negotiations is small.  On the other hand, when   at each point on the efficiency frontier,
the limited-instrument efficiency frontier defined when   lies well below the unconstrained
efficiency frontier.  In this case, then, the efficiency loss from the elimination of subsidies as a policy
instrument is large.  Together, these two features imply that the limited-instrument efficiency frontier
passes below the Nash point in these circumstances.  
We now consider the possibility that the stage-1 negotiations in the WTO Subsidy Game
might end without agreement.  For simplicity, we assume that the stage-1 negotiations take the
following form.  The foreign government makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a domestic-foreign tariff
pair, which the domestic government either accepts or rejects.  Acceptance means that the offered
tariff pair becomes the negotiated tariff levels   in stage 1, and that as before the domestic tariff
cannot be altered from that level in any subsequent stage of the WTO Subsidy Game while the
foreign tariff can only be altered with a CVD response in stage 4.  We refer to this outcome as
“agreement” in stage 1.  Rejection means that the pair of Nash tariff levels becomes the tariff levels 
in stage 1, and that each government is free to adjust its tariff in each subsequent stage of the WTO
Subsidy Game.
23  We refer to this outcome as “disagreement” in stage 1.  
It may now be seen that, if (i) agreement in stage 1 of the WTO Subsidy Game ensures that
an SCM claim will be brought and therefore leads to payoffs on (or below) the limited-instrument
efficiency frontier, and (ii) disagreement in stage 1 of the WTO Subsidy Game ensures that an SCM
claim will not be brought and therefore leads to the Nash payoffs, then the outcome of the WTO
Subsidy Game in these circumstances must be disagreement in stage 1, and each government
receives its Nash payoff.  In other words, in these circumstances, the WTO subsidy rules completely
undermine the ability of tariff negotiations to serve as the mechanism for expanding market access24With agreement implying that the stage-1 tariff levels of each government are necessarily fixed near their
respective reaction curves when the Nash trade volume is small, the foreign government must gain from the additional
access to the domestic market and consequent terms-of-trade improvement that would be generated by the SCM claim
against the domestic subsidy, with one exception. In an extreme case, if the domestic subsidy were sufficiently large, it
is possible that the foreign government might lose from the elimination of this subsidy with its tariff fixed near its Nash
level, if it considered the implied movements in the foreign local price to be sufficiently costly.  Hence, our argument
above assumes that the role of domestic subsidies is sufficiently important to position the limited-instrument efficiency
frontier well below the unconstrained efficiency frontier, but not so extreme as to generate this exceptional case. 
25This can be seen as follows.  With disagreement in stage 1, the Nash equilibrium must prevail provided that
the domestic subsidy choice is not challenged under the SCM Agreement.  But with sufficiently small Nash trade volume,
if the foreign government were to bring an SCM claim and remove the domestic subsidy, it is easy to see that the
domestic government’s best-response tariff when deprived of its production subsidy would bring about autarky, owing
to the additionally trade-restrictive effect of the consumption tax implied by the tariff, and therefore reduce the welfare
of the foreign government below the Nash level.  Hence, with sufficiently small Nash trade volume, disagreement in stage
1 ensures that no SCM claim will be made against the domestic subsidy.
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to more efficient levels, and governments are resigned to their Nash payoffs.  That (i) holds follows
from the fact that (a) each tariff must be set in stage-1 at a level below the respective government’s
reaction curve for both governments to gain from agreement, and (b) when the Nash trade volume
is small neither government can be positioned very far below its reaction curve if it is to gain from
agreement, so that (c) the foreign government must then gain from the terms-of-trade improvement
implied by a subsequent SCM claim against the domestic subsidy.
24  That (ii) holds follows from the
fact that, when the Nash trade volume is small, the foreign government must prefer its Nash payoff
to the payoff it would receive in the non-cooperative equilibrium which would follow disagreement
in stage 1 if the domestic government were denied access (by an SCM claim) to the less-trade-
restrictive production subsidy and had to rely only on the more-trade-restrictive tariff to achieve its
policy objectives.
25 
We may therefore state:
Proposition 6: In the presence of limited domestic policy instruments and costly NVNI claims,
GATT subsidy rules must lead to more efficient outcomes than WTO subsidy rules when the
domestic government seeks to intervene on behalf of its import-competing producers, provided that
the efficiency loss from the elimination of subsidies as a policy instrument is sufficiently important
relative to the potential efficiency gain from international negotiations.44
We may also state the following:
Corollary: If the role of production subsidies in an internationally efficient policy environment is
sufficiently important, the WTO subsidy rules can completely undermine the ability of tariff
negotiations to serve as the mechanism for expanding market access to more efficient levels.
Intuitively, if governments consider domestic subsidies to be a sufficiently vital policy
instrument, they may be less inclined to negotiate tariff commitments under the subsidy rules of the
WTO, since such commitments may increase the likelihood that their subsidies will be challenged
under the SCM Agreement.  In this way, the SCM Agreement may have a “chilling” effect on the
desire of governments to take on further market access commitments through WTO negotiations.
Proposition 6 and its Corollary provide some formal support for the view expressed by
Jackson (1989, p. 269) and quoted above in section III.1, that “...the whole area of subsidy activity
in international law, ...holds the potential, if misapplied, of undermining the basic policy goals of
the post- World War II liberal trade system.”  However, the implication of Propositions 5 and 6 taken
together is also somewhat ironic, and may be stated as follows: although GATT subsidy rules may
appear weak and inadequate while WTO subsidy rules are seen as representing a significant
strengthening of multilateral disciplines on subsidies, the key changes introduced by the WTO
subsidy rules may ultimately do more damage than good to the multilateral trading system, by
undermining the ability of tariff negotiations to serve as the mechanism for expanding market access.
VI. Conclusion
International disputes over subsidies are increasingly disrupting the world trading system.
Yet the international rules that govern subsidies have received little attention in the form of
systematic economic analysis.  In this paper we have provided a first formal analysis of the
international rules that govern the use of subsidies to domestic production (as distinct from export
subsidies).  Our analysis highlights the impact of the new disciplines on subsidies that were added
to GATT rules with the creation of the WTO.  Though GATT subsidy rules were seen as weak and
inadequate while the WTO subsidy rules are viewed as a significant strengthening of multilateral45
disciplines on subsidies, we find that the key changes introduced by the WTO subsidy rules may
ultimately do more harm than good to the multilateral trading system, by undermining the ability of
tariff negotiations to serve as the mechanism for expanding market access to more efficient levels.
The possibility that WTO subsidy rules could have a “chilling” effect on the desire of
governments to make further market access commitments through WTO negotiations reflects a
possible resolution of the tension between a system of rules that now places more stringent limits
on subsidies than on tariffs and the basic message of the Bhagwati-Johnson-Ramaswami targeting
principle.  This tension arises because, according to the targeting principle, production subsidies are
typically a better policy instrument  for achieving production goals than are tariffs, but according to
WTO rules, tariffs rather than production subsidies may be the only permissible instrument available
to WTO-member governments.  As we have observed above, one possible resolution of this tension
is that governments may refrain from accepting negotiated limits on their use of tariffs, if their ability
to utilize production subsidies without challenge under WTO subsidy rules is thereby enhanced.
This paper raises at least as many questions as it answers.  Among the most important
questions are: (i) A central efficiency-enhancing role is suggested for the right to bring NVNI claims,
but we have modeled these claims stylistically (and perhaps unrealistically) as securing the level of
negotiated market access.  Does this central role survive when the nature of NVNI claims is modeled
more precisely?; (ii) Our results do not indicate that any efficiency-enhancing role is played by the
right to impose CVDs.  What role, if any, do CVDs play in facilitating efficient policy outcomes in
a richer setting?; (iii) Our results indicate that a crucial feature upon which the impacts of GATT and
WTO subsidy rules hinges is the richness of the set of available domestic policy instruments.  Are
governments in fact better characterized as possessing redundant sets of policy instruments or facing
more limited policy options?; and finally, (iv) Our results suggest that the WTO Subsidy rules may
mark a step backward, in the sense that they may lead to less efficient outcomes than were possible
under the GATT subsidy rules.  If one accepts this suggestion, then the natural next question is, How
could this (inferior) change have been agreed to by the GATT/WTO members? We leave these and
other important questions to future work.46
References
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger, "Strategic Export Subsidies and Reciprocal Trade
Agreements: The Natural Monopoly Case," Japan and the World Economy, volume 9, issue
4, 1997, pp. 491-510.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger, “An Economic Theory of GATT,” American Economic
Review, March 1999, pp. 215-248.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger, “Strategic Trade, Competitive Industries and Agricultural
Trade Disputes,” Economics and Politics, July 2001a, pp. 113-128.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger, “Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty and International
Economic Institutions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2001b, pp. 519-562.
Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, The Economics of The World Trading System, MIT Press,
2002.
Bhagwati, Jagdish and V.K. Ramaswami, “Domestic Distortions, Tariffs and the Theory of
Optimum Subsidy,” Journal of Political Economy 71 (1), February 1963, pp. 44-50.
Jackson, John H., The World Trading System, MIT Press, 1989.
Johnson, Harry G., “Optimal Trade Intervention in the Presence of Domestic Distortions,” in R.E.
Caves, H.G. Johnson and P.B. Kenen (eds.), Trade, Growth and the Balance of Payments,
Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1965.
Lawrence, Robert Z., Crimes & Punishments? Retaliation under the WTO, Institute for
International Economics, Washington D.C., October 2003. 
Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Law,
International Organizations and Dispute Settlement. London: Kluwer Law International,
1997.